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Many have criticized the Federal Circuit over the years for expanding 
its jurisdiction or applying its own law in inappropriate circumstances.1 
Paul Gugliuzza, for example, recently argued that the Federal Circuit has 
wrongly expanded its jurisdiction “to protect and enhance its power 
relative to state courts,”2 and that it “has improperly leveraged choice-of-
law doctrine to expand the scope of federal common law and restrict the 
scope of state contract law.”3 In this regard, Xuan-Thao Nguyen’s article, 
In the Name of Patent Stewardship: The Federal Circuit’s Overreach into 
Commercial Law,4 might be seen as “piling on”—simply more detailed 
evidence of overreaching by the nation’s patent court, which is troubling, 
but familiar.  
It is quite another thing, however, to criticize the Federal Circuit for 
systematically arriving at wrong conclusions in matters of commercial law 
traditionally governed by state law and state courts. This is a new critique, 
and it is important for at least two potential reasons that Nguyen 
highlights. First, to the extent that the Federal Circuit’s decisions related to 
commercial law differ from state courts’ decisions related to commercial 
law, it might call into question the Federal Circuit’s competency with 
respect to commercial law.5 And, second, it certainly highlights something 
that practitioners might need to know to adapt their advice and strategies 
for reaching their clients’ desired ends.6 Indeed, Nguyen makes both 
claims, and not without a substantial basis in both her expertise and 
analysis.7 
But Nguyen’s critique is important for a third reason. Assuming the 
Federal Circuit’s competency, her critique calls into question the Federal 
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Circuit’s reasoning and motivation, not only for its repeated decisions to 
follow its own law rather than state commercial law, but also for its 
substantive conclusions. In other words, the preliminary question is: Why 
is the Federal Circuit choosing its own law rather than state commercial 
law? But the next question is perhaps more important: Why does the 
Federal Circuit’s law result in different outcomes when compared to state 
commercial law? The Federal Circuit leaves these questions 
unanswered—even unaddressed. Nguyen’s implicit accusation is that there 
is no good reason for the Federal Circuit to choose its own law, 
particularly when it leads to a different result. 
With regard to the preliminary question, it is important to note that two 
of the three decisions she highlights resolved jurisdictional challenges on 
grounds of lack of constitutional standing by plaintiffs.8 In these two cases 
the Federal Circuit was not merely deciding questions of commercial law. 
In the first case, for example, it was not just deciding a question of state 
contract law governing sales and purchases of assets. Nor was the Federal 
Circuit, in the second case, just deciding a question of state law governing 
liquidating trusts. No, in these two cases the court was addressing these 
issues as predicates to the ultimate question of constitutional standing; 
they were subsidiary issues. To be precise, in the first case the subsidiary 
issue was exactly when the plaintiff acquired legal title to the patent-in-
suit, where this issue needed to be addressed for purposes of a 
constitutional standing analysis.9 And in the second case, the subsidiary 
issue was whether the plaintiff suffered injury in fact, where this issue 
likewise needed to be addressed to determine constitutional standing.10  
Nguyen effectively characterizes these subsidiary issues as legal 
questions governed by state commercial law. That may be true. What is 
missing in these two cases is any analysis of whether state contract law or 
Federal Circuit constitutional standing law should apply in these 
circumstances to resolve these underlying issues. The Federal Circuit 
simply applied its precedent on the matter of constitutional standing. An 
actual analysis of choice of law would have to confront critical doctrines 
that state courts do not confront when they decide only the underlying 
questions of commercial law: supremacy, federalism, and uniformity. It is 
these doctrines that the Federal Circuit fails to engage. Which doctrine 
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should trump the other? Traditional notions of the supremacy of federal 
law might indicate that the Federal Circuit’s standing law should prevail. 
Traditional notions of federalism might indicate that state commercial law 
should prevail. And uniformity is a doctrine that the Federal Circuit has 
repeatedly cited as a reason for it to apply its own law in patent cases.11 
For her part, Nguyen focuses on federalism, but she does not address 
competing concerns with supremacy and uniformity.12 Confronting these 
doctrines would require consideration of whether constitutional standing 
in any particular case should turn on the applicable state commercial law, 
and whether this would create any (or too much) uncertainty. These 
doctrines might explain the Federal Circuit’s decision to apply its own 
law. 
With regard to the second question, what Nguyen has identified—other 
than potential incompetency, teaching moments for practicing attorneys, 
and a missing choice-of-law analysis—is a potential tension between the 
policies underlying the Federal Circuit’s constitutional standing law and 
the policies underlying state commercial law. In short, what is particularly 
troubling is that the Federal Circuit has not explained why, when it applies 
its own law of constitutional standing, it reaches conclusions that do not 
appear to coincide with state commercial law and, moreover, why that is 
okay. It is apparent that Nguyen finds the policies underlying state 
commercial law—to “encourage corporate commercial transactions such 
as asset transfers” and to enable a bankruptcy trustee “to pursue causes of 
action for its beneficiaries, to oversee various litigation and tax matters, to 
prosecute avoidance actions, or to complete distributions to unsecured 
creditors”—to be particularly beneficial. 13  But she has not explicitly 
addressed competing concerns underlying constitutional standing, such as 
“ensuring that litigants are truly adverse and therefore likely to present the 
case effectively” and “ensuring that the people most directly concerned are 
able to litigate the questions at issue.”14 
In sum, Nguyen has made a substantial contribution to the analysis of 
the Federal Circuit’s handling of matters related to state law. Further 
analysis of two issues, at least with respect to two of the three cases she 
highlights, however, would be helpful: (1) choice of law given the 
doctrines of supremacy and uniformity; and (2) whether the policies 
underlying constitutional standing trump the policies underlying 
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commercial law. With regard to these issues, neither the Federal Circuit 
nor Nguyen have made their case. An explicit analysis of these issues by 
Nguyen would no doubt redound to the great benefit of the Federal Circuit 
and its bar. 
